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Abstract
Generative models estimate the underlying distribution of a
dataset to generate realistic samples according to that distri-
bution. In this paper, we present the first membership infer-
ence attacks against generative models: given a data point,
the adversary determines whether or not it was used to train
the model. Our attacks leverage Generative Adversarial Net-
works (GANs), which combine a discriminative and a genera-
tive model, to detect overfitting and recognize inputs that were
part of training datasets, using the discriminator’s capacity to
learn statistical differences in distributions.
We present attacks based on both white-box and black-box
access to the target model, against several state-of-the-art gen-
erative models, over datasets of complex representations of
faces (LFW), objects (CIFAR-10), and medical images (Di-
abetic Retinopathy). We also discuss the sensitivity of the
attacks to different training parameters, and their robustness
against mitigation strategies, finding that defenses are either
ineffective or lead to significantly worse performances of the
generative models in terms of training stability and/or sample
quality.
1 Introduction
Over the past few years, providers such as Google, Microsoft,
and Amazon have started to provide customers with access to
APIs allowing them to easily embed machine learning tasks
into their applications. Organizations can use Machine Learn-
ing as a Service (MLaaS) engines to outsource complex tasks,
e.g., training classifiers, performing predictions, clustering,
etc. They can also let others query models trained on their
data, possibly at a cost. However, if malicious users were
able to recover data used to train these models, the resulting
information leakage would create serious issues. In particu-
lar, organizations do not have much control over the kind of
models and training parameters used by the platform, and this
might lead to overfitting (i.e., the model does not generalize
well outside the data on which it was trained), which provides
attackers with a useful tool to recover training data [57].
In recent years, research in deep learning has made tremen-
dous progress in the area of generative models. These mod-
els are used to generate new samples from the same under-
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lying distribution of a given training dataset. In particular,
generative models offer a way to artificially generate plausi-
ble images and videos and they are used in many applications,
e.g., compression [60], denoising [7], inpainting [69], super-
resolution [35], semi-supervised learning [54], etc.
In this paper, we study the feasibility of membership infer-
ence attacks against generative models. That is, given access
to a generative model and an individual data record, can an
attacker tell if a specific record was used to train the model?
Membership inference on generative models is likely to be
more challenging than on discriminative ones (see, e.g., [57]).
The latter attempt to predict a label given a data input, and an
attacker can use the confidence the model places on an input
belonging to a label to perform the attack. In generative mod-
els, there is no such signal, thus, it is difficult to both detect
overfitting and infer membership.
1.1 Motivation
We study how generating synthetic samples through gen-
erative models may lead to information leakage. In particu-
lar, we focus on membership inference attacks against them,
which are relevant to, and can be used in, a number of settings:
Direct privacy breach. Membership inference can directly
violate privacy if inclusion in a training set is itself sensitive.
For example, if synthetic health-related images (i.e., gener-
ated by generative models) are used for research purposes,
discovering that a specific record was used for training leaks
information about the individual’s health. (Note that image
synthesis is commonly used to create datasets for healthcare
applications [44, 13].) Similarly, if images from a database of
criminals are used to train a face generation algorithm [67],
membership inference may expose an individual’s criminal
history.
Establishing wrongdoing. Regulators can use membership
inference to support the suspicion that a model was trained on
personal data without an adequate legal basis, or for a pur-
pose not compatible with the data collection. For instance,
DeepMind was recently found to have used personal medical
records provided by the UK’s National Health Service for pur-
poses beyond direct patient care; the basis on which the data
was collected [64]. In general, membership inference against
generative models allow regulators to assess whether personal
information has been used to train a generative model.
Assessing privacy protection. Our methods can be used by
cloud providers that offer MLaaS for generative models (e.g.,
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Neuromation1) to evaluate the level of “privacy” of a trained
model. In other words, they can use them as a benchmark be-
fore allowing third parties access to the model; providers may
restrict access in case the inference attack yields good results.
Also, susceptibility to membership inference likely correlates
with other leakage and with overfitting; in fact, the relation-
ship between robust privacy protections and generalizations
have been discussed by Dwork et al. [17].
Overall, membership inference attacks are often a gateway
to further attacks. That is, the adversary first infers whether
data of a victim is part of the information she has access to (a
trained model in our case), and then mount other attacks (e.g.,
profiling [49], property inference [4, 41], etc.), which might
leak additional information about the victim.
1.2 Roadmap
Attacks Overview. We consider both black-box and white-
box attacks: in the former, the adversary can only make
queries to the model under attack, i.e., the target model, and
has no access to the internal parameters. In the latter, he also
has access to the parameters. To mount the attacks, we train a
Generative Adversarial Network (GAN) model [20] on sam-
ples generated from the target model; specifically, we use gen-
erative models as a method to learn information about the tar-
get generative model, and thus create a local copy of the target
model from which we can launch the attack. Our intuition is
that, if a generative model overfits, then a GAN, which com-
bines a discriminative model and a generative model, should
be able to detect this overfitting, even if it is not observable to
a human, since the discriminator is trained to learn statistical
differences in distributions. We rely on GANs to classify real
and synthetic records to recognize differences in samples gen-
erated from the target model, on inputs on which it was trained
versus those on which it was not. Moreover, for white-box at-
tacks, the attacker-trained discriminator itself can be used to
measure information leakage of the target model.
Experiments. We test our attacks on several state-of-the-art
models: Deep Convolutional GAN (DCGAN) [52], Boundary
Equilibrium GAN (BEGAN) [8], and the combination of DC-
GAN with a Variational Autoencoder (DCGAN+VAE) [34],
using datasets with complex representations of faces (LFW),
objects (CIFAR-10), and medical images (Diabetic Retinopa-
thy), containing rich details both in the foreground and back-
ground. This represents a much more challenging task for the
attacker compared to simple datasets such as MNIST, where
samples from each class have very similar features.
Contributions. In summary, our contributions include:
1. We present the first study of membership inference at-
tacks on generative models;
2. We devise a white-box attack that is an excellent indica-
tor of overfitting in generative models, and a black-box
attack that can be mounted through Generative Adversar-
ial Networks, and show how to boost the performance of
1https://neuromation.io
the black-box attack via auxiliary attacker knowledge of
training/testing set;
3. We show that our white-box attacks are 100% successful
at inferring which samples were used to train the target
model, while we can recover up to over 80% of the train-
ing set with black-box access;
4. We investigate possible defense strategies, including
training regularizers, showing that they are either inef-
fective or lead to significantly worse performances of the
models in terms of the quality of the samples generated
and/or training stability.
Paper Organization. The rest of this paper is organized as
follows. The next section reviews related work, then, Sec-
tion 3 introduces machine learning concepts used in the rest
of the paper, while Section 4 presents our attacks. In Sec-
tion 5, we present the results of our experimental evaluation,
and, in Section 6, we discuss the cost of our attacks as well as
possible mitigation strategies. Finally, the paper concludes in
Section 7.
2 Related Work
We now review prior work on attacks and defense mechanisms
on machine learning models.
2.1 Attacks
Over the past few years, a few privacy attacks on machine
learning have been proposed. For instance, attacks targeting
distributed recommender systems [10] have focused on infer-
ring which inputs cause output changes by looking at temporal
patterns of the model.
Specific to membership inference are attacks against super-
vised models by Shokri et al. [57]. Their approach exploits
differences in the model’s response to inputs that were or were
not seen during training. For each class of the targeted black-
box model, they train a shadow model, with the same machine
learning technique. Whereas, our approach targets genera-
tive models and relies on GANs to provide a general frame-
work for measuring the information leakage. As mentioned
earlier, membership inference on generative models is much
more challenging than on discriminative models: in the for-
mer, the attacker cannot exploit confidence values on inputs
belonging to the same classes, thus it is more difficult to detect
overfitting and mount the attack. As a matter of fact, detect-
ing overfitting in generative models is regarded as one of the
most important research problems in machine learning [68].
Overall, our work presents black-box attacks that do not rely
on any prediction vectors from the target model, as generic
generative models output synthetic samples.
Additional membership inference attacks focus on genomic
research studies [24, 5], whereby an attacker aims to infer the
presence of a particular individual’s data within an aggregate
genomic dataset, or aggregate locations [50].
Then, in model inversion attacks [19], an adversary extracts
training data from outputted model predictions. Fredrikson et
al. [18] show how an attacker can rely on outputs from a model
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to infer sensitive features used as inputs to the model itself:
given the model and some demographic information about a
patient whose records are used for training, an attacker pre-
dicts sensitive attributes of the patient. However, the attack
does not generalize on inputs not seen at training time, thus,
the attacker relies on statistical inference about the total pop-
ulation [40]. The record extracted by the attacker is not an ac-
tual training record, but an average representation of the inputs
that are classified in a particular class. Long et al. [37] and
Yeom et al. [70] investigate connections between membership
inference and model inversion attacks against machine learn-
ing classifiers. In particular, [70] assumes that the adversary
knows the distribution from which the training set was drawn
and its size, and that the adversary colludes with the training
algorithm. Their attacks are close in performance to Shokri et
al.’s [57], and show that, besides overfitting, the influence of
target attributes on model’s outputs also correlates with suc-
cessful attacks. Then, Tramer et al. [61] present a model ex-
traction attack to infer the parameters from a trained classifier,
however, it only applies to scenarios where the attacker has
access to the probabilities returned for each class.
Song et al. [58] attacks force a machine learning model to
memorize the training data in such a way that an adversary
can later extract training inputs with only black-box access to
the model. Then, Carlini et al. [11] show that deep learning-
based language models trained on text data can unintention-
ally memorize specific training inputs, which can then be ex-
tracted with black-box access, however, demonstrating it only
for simple sequences of digits artificially introduced into the
text. Ateniese et al. [4] present a few attacks against SVM and
HMM classifiers aimed to reconstruct properties about train-
ing sets, by exploiting knowledge of model parameters.
Also, recent work [41, 2, 23] present inference attacks
against distributed deep learning [56, 39]. In particular,
Aono et al. [2] target the collaborative privacy-preserving
deep learning protocol of [56], and show that an honest-but-
curious server can partially recover participants’ data points
from the shared gradient updates. However, they operate on
a simplified setting where the batch consists of a single data
point. Also, Hitaj et al. [23] introduce a white-box attack
against [56], which relies on GAN models to generate valid
samples of a particular class from a targeted private training
set, however, it cannot be extended to black-box scenarios.
Furthermore, evaluation of the attack is limited to the MNIST
dataset of handwritten digits where all samples in a class look
very similar, and the AT&T Dataset of Faces, which consists
of only 400 grayscale images of faces. By contrast, our evalu-
ation is performed on 13,233, 60,000, and 88,702 images for
the LFW, CIFAR-10, and Diabetic Retinopathy datasets, re-
spectively (see Section 5).
Finally, Truex et al. [63] show how membership inference
attacks are data-driven and largely transferable, while Melis
et al. [41] demonstrate how an adversarial participant can suc-
cessfully perform membership inference in distributed learn-
ing [56, 39], as well as inferring sensitive properties that hold
only for a subset of the participants’ training data.
2.2 Defenses
Privacy-enhancing tools based on secure multiparty com-
putation and homomorphic encryption have been proposed
to securely train supervised machine learning models, such
as decision trees [36], linear regressors [15], and neural net-
works [9, 14]. However, these mechanisms do not prevent
an attacker from running inference attacks on the privately
trained models as the final parameters are left unchanged.
Differential Privacy [16] can be used to mitigate infer-
ence attacks, and it has been widely applied to various ma-
chine learning models [1, 46, 56, 65, 33, 66]. Shokri and
Shmatikov [56] support distributed training of deep learning
networks in a privacy-preserving way, where independent en-
tities collaboratively build a model without sharing their train-
ing data, but selectively share subsets of noisy model param-
eters during training. Abadi et al. [1] show how to train deep
neural networks (DNNs) with non-convex objectives with an
acceptable privacy budget, while Rahman et al. [53] show that
Abadi et al.’s proposal partially mitigates the effects of Shokri
et al.’s [57] membership inference attack.
Papernot et al. [46, 48] combine multiple models trained
with disjoint datasets without exposing the models, while,
in [47], present “defensive distillation” to reduce the effec-
tiveness of adversarial samples on DNNs.
Then, Beaulieu et al. [6] apply the noisy gradient descent
from [1] to train the discriminator of a Generative Adversar-
ial Network under differential privacy. The resulting model is
then used to generate synthetic subjects based on the popula-
tion of clinical trial data. Finally, Jia et al.[28] use adversarial
machine learning to defend against attribute inference attacks,
in the setting where an attacker trains a classifier to infer a
target user’s sensitive attributes from their public data, while
Nasr et al. [43] leverage adversarial regularizers to design a
privacy-preserving training mechanism with provable protec-
tions against membership inference attacks against discrimi-
native models.
3 Background
In this section, we review machine learning concepts used
throughout the paper.
Generative Models. Machine learning models include dis-
criminative and generative ones. Given a supervised learning
task, and given the features (x) of a data-point and the corre-
sponding label (y), discriminative models attempt to predict
y on future x by learning a discriminative function f from
(x,y); the function takes in input x and outputs the most
likely label y. Discriminative models are not able to “ex-
plain” how the data-points might have been generated. By
contrast, generative models describe how data is generated by
learning the joint probability distribution of p(X,Y), which
gives a score to the configuration determined together by pairs
(x,y). Generative models based on deep neural networks,
such as Generative Adversarial Networks (GAN) [20] (intro-
duced below) and Variational Auto-encoders (VAE) [31] are
considered the state-of-the-art for producing samples of real-
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Figure 1: Generative Adversarial Network (GAN).
istic images [30].
Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) [20] are neural
networks trained in an adversarial manner to generate data
mimicking some distribution. The main intuition is to have
two competing neural network models. One takes noise as
input and generates samples–and so is called the generator.
The other model, the discriminator, receives samples from
both the generator and the training data, and has to be able
to distinguish between the two sources. The two networks
play a continuous game where the generator is learning to pro-
duce more and more realistic samples, and the discriminator
is learning to get better and better at distinguishing generated
data from real data, as depicted in Fig. 1.
More formally, to learn the generator’s output distribution
over data-points x, we define a prior on input noise variables
pz(z), then represent a mapping to data space as G(z; θg),
where G is a generative deep neural network with parame-
ters θg . We also define a discriminator D(x; θd) that outputs
D(x) ∈ [0, 1], representing the probability that x was taken
from the training set rather than from the generator G. D is
trained to maximize the probability of assigning the correct
label to both real training examples and fake samples from G.
We simultaneously train G to minimize log(1 − D(G(z))).
The final optimization problem solved by the two networks D
and G follows a two-player minimax game as:
minGmaxD Ex∼pdata(x)[logD(x)] + Ez∼pz(z)[log(1−D(G(z)))]
First, gradients of D are computed to discriminate fake sam-
ples from training data, then G is updated to generate sam-
ples that are more likely to be classified as data. After several
steps of training, ifG andD have enough capacity and a Nash
equilibrium is achieved, they will reach a point at which both
cannot improve [20].
Recently, Lucic et al. [38] show that, despite a large num-
ber of proposed changes to the original GAN model [8, 3, 21]
it is still difficult to assess if one performs better than an-
other. They also show that the original GAN performs equally
well against other state-of-the-art GANs, concluding that any
improvements are due to computational budgets and hyper-
parameter tuning, rather than scientific breakthroughs.
Variational Auto-encoders (VAE) [31]. VAEs [31] consist
of two neural networks (an encoder and a decoder) and a loss
function. The encoder compresses data into a latent space
(z) while the decoder reconstructs the data given the hid-
den representation. Rather than attempting to maximize the
likelihood, one could maximize a lower bound of the likeli-
hood, thus, if the lower bound increases to a given level, the
likelihood must be at least as high. If hidden variables are
continuous, the lower bound, introduced by Variational Auto-
encoders (VAEs), can be used. More formally, let x be a ran-
dom vector of observed variables, which are either discrete
or continuous. Let z be a random vector of latent continuous
variables.
The probability distribution between x and z assumes the
form pθ(x, z) = pθ(z)pθ(x | z), where θ indicates that p is
parametrized by θ. Also, let qφ(z | x) be a recognition model
whose goal is to approximate the true and intractable poste-
rior distribution pθ(z | x). We can then define a lower-bound
on the log-likelihood of x as follows: L(x) = −DKL(qφ(z |
x) || pθ(z)) + Eqφ(z|x)[log pθ(x | z)]. The first term pushes
qφ(z | x) to be similar to pθ(z) ensuring that, while training,
the VAE learns a decoder that, at generation time, will be able
to invert samples from the prior distribution such they look
just like the training data. The second term can be seen as a
form of reconstruction cost, and needs to be approximated by
sampling from qφ(z | x). In VAEs, the gradient signal is prop-
agated through the sampling process and through qφ(z | x),
using the so-called re-parametrization trick. This is done by
making z be a deterministic function of φ and some noise ,
i.e., z = f(φ, ). For instance, sampling from a normal distri-
bution can be done as z = µ + σ, where  ∼ N (0, I). The
re-parametrization trick can be viewed as an efficient way of
adapting qφ(z | x) to help improve the reconstruction. VAEs
are trained using stochastic gradient descent to optimize the
loss w.r.t. the parameters of the encoder and decoder θ and φ.
Larsen et al. [34] combine VAEs and GANs into an unsu-
pervised generative model that simultaneously learns to en-
code and generate new samples, which contain more details,
sampled from the training data-points.
4 Membership Inference Attacks
Against Generative Models
In this section, we present our membership inference attacks
against generative models.
4.1 Threat Model
We consider an adversary that aims to infer whether a single
known record was included in the training set of a generative
model. We distinguish between two settings: black-box and
white-box attacks. In the former, the attacker can only make
queries to the target model under attack – which we denote
as the target model – and has no access to the internal param-
eters of the model; in the latter, they also have access to the
parameters of a trained target model. Overall, the accuracy of
the attack is measured as the fraction of the records correctly
inferred as members of the training set.
Assumptions. In both settings, the adversary knows the size
of the training set, but not its original data-points. Variants
of the attack allow the adversary to access some further side
information, as discussed below. In order to evaluate the accu-
racy of our attacks, we will consider an attacker attempting to
distinguish data-points used to train the target model, thus, we
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Figure 2: High-level Outline of the White-Box Attack.
consider an attacker that has a set with data points they suspect
are in the original training records. However, the construction
of the attack does not depend on access to any dataset. We
also assume the attacker knows the size of the training set, but
does not know how data-points are split into training and test
sets.
In the white-box attacks, the adversary only needs access
to the discriminator of a target GAN model. In particular,
we consider a setting where target model parameters – i.e.,
both generator and discriminator in the target GAN model –
are leaked following a data breach or models initially trained
on cloud platforms and then compressed/deployed to mobile
devices [22].
Black-box Setting. In black-box attacks, we assume the at-
tacker does not have prior or side information about training
records or the target model. In particular, the attack proceeds
with no knowledge of the following:
1. Target model parameters and hyper-parameters: No ac-
cess to network weights from the trained target model,
nor to hyper-parameters such as regularization parame-
ters or number of epochs used to train the target model.
2. Target model architecture: The attacker has no knowl-
edge of the architecture of the target model.
3. Dataset used to train the target model: No knowledge
of data-points used to train the target model, or the type
of data-points used in training, since this is inferred from
sampling the target model at inference time. Note that,
by contrast, the membership inference attack on discrim-
inative models by Shokri et al. [57] does require some
information about the dataset, e.g., the syntactic format
of data records used in training, in order to generate syn-
thetic samples used in the attack.
4. Prediction values: Shokri et al. [57] show that predic-
tions scores leak information used to perform member-
ship inference attacks. However, due to the very nature
of generative models, in our attacks, the adversary cannot
generate prediction scores directly from the target model.
4.2 White-Box Attack
We now present our white-box attack; a high-level descrip-
tion is given in Fig. 2.
To evaluate the attack, here we assume that an attacker
Awb has access to the trained target model, namely, a GAN
Figure 3: White-Box Prediction Method: The attacker in-
puts data-points to the DiscriminatorD (1), extracts the output
probabilities (2), and sorts them (3).
– i.e., a generator Gtarget and a discriminator Dtarget. The
attacker has a dataset, X = {x1, . . . , xm+n}, which they sus-
pect contains data-points used to train the target model, where
n is the size of the training set, and m is the number of data-
points that do not belong to the training set.
The target model has been trained to generate samples that
resemble the training set samples. Awb creates a local copy
of Dtarget, which we refer to as Dwb. Then, as shown in
Fig. 3, Awb inputs all samples X = {x1, . . . , xm+n} into
Dwb, which outputs the resulting probability vector p =
[Dwb(x1), . . . , Dwb(xm+n)]. If the target model overfitted on
the training data, Dwb will place a higher confidence value on
samples that were part of the training set. Awb sorts their pre-
dictions, p, in descending order and takes the samples asso-
ciated with the largest n probabilities as predictions for mem-
bers of the training set.
Note that the attacker does not need to train a model; rather,
it relies on internal access to the target model, from which the
attack can be launched.
4.3 Black-Box Attack with No Auxiliary
Knowledge
In the black-box setting, we assume that the attacker
Abb does not have access to the target model parameters.
Thus, Abb cannot directly steal the discriminator model from
the target as in the white-box attack. Furthermore, while in
the white-box attack we restrict the target model to be a GAN,
here we do not, and the target model may not have an associ-
ated discriminative model (as with VAEs).
Again, to evaluate the attack, we assume the attacker has a
dataset, X = {x1, . . . , xm+n}, with data-points suspected to
have been used to train the target model, where n is the size
of the training set. However, the attacker has no knowledge of
how the training set was constructed from X , thus, they do no
have access to the true labels of samples from the dataset and
so cannot train a model using a discriminative approach. In-
stead, Abb trains a GAN in order to re-create the target model
locally and, in the process, creates a discriminator Dbb, which
detects overfitting in the generative target model Gtarget.
We illustrate the attack in Fig. 4a. Specifically, Abb locally
trains a GAN (Gbb, Dbb) using queries from the target, i.e.,
Abb trains the local GAN on samples generated by Gtarget.
As the black-box attack depends only on samples generated
by the target model, Gtarget can be any generative model.
We assume Abb has neither knowledge nor control over the
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 4: High-level overview of the (a) black-box attack with no auxiliary knowledge, and (b) Discriminative and (c) Generative
black-box attack with limited auxiliary attacker knowledge.
source of randomness used to generate the samples generated
by Gbb. After the GAN has been trained, the attack proceeds
to the white-box setting, i.e., Abb inputs data-points X into
Dbb, sorts the resulting probabilities, and takes the largest n
points as predictions for the training set (as shown in Fig. 3).
4.4 Black-Box Attack with Limited Auxiliary
Knowledge
In the black-box attack presented above, we assume that
Abb has no additional knowledge about subsets of members
of the dataset. However, we also study the case where an
attacker could leverage limited additional side information
about the training set. This is a realistic setting, which has
been considered extensively in the literature; for instance,
social graph knowledge has been used to de-anonymize so-
cial networks [42]. Overall, auxiliary/incomplete knowl-
edge of sensitive datasets is a common assumption in litera-
ture [51, 27]. Further, the attacker might be able to collect ad-
ditional information, e.g., from pictures on online social net-
works or from datasets leaked from data breaches, where the
pictures have been used to train the target model under attack.
Access to side information about the training set means that
the attacker can “augment” the black-box attack. We consider
two settings: a generative and a discriminative one; in either,
the attacker has incomplete knowledge of members of the test
dataset, the training dataset, or both.
Discriminative setting. We consider an attacker that trains a
simple discriminative model to infer membership of the train-
ing set, as illustrated in Fig. 4b. This is feasible since the
attacker now has access to membership binary labels, i.e.,
whether data points belong to the training set or not. Thus,
they do not need to train a generative model to detect overfit-
ting. Within this setting, we consider two scenarios where the
attacker has limited auxiliary knowledge of:
(1) Samples that were not used to train the target model;
(2) Both training set and test set samples.
In both cases, the general method of attack is the same: an
attacker trains a local model to detect overfitting in the tar-
get model. In (1), the discriminator, D, is fed samples from
this auxiliary set, labeled as fake samples, and samples gener-
ated by the target model, labeled as real samples. If the target
model overfits the training set, D will learn to discriminate
between training and test samples. In (2), D is fed both target
generated samples and the auxiliary training samples, labeled
as real samples, and samples from the auxiliary test set, la-
beled as fake. Once the attacker has trained a discriminator,
the attack again proceeds as described in Fig. 3. Note that
we have to consider that the attacker knows some test samples
(i.e., fake samples) in order to properly train a binary discrim-
inator.
Generative setting. We also consider a generative attack, as
outlined in Fig. 4c, again, as per two scenarios, where the
attacker has limited auxiliary knowledge of:
(1) Samples that were used to train the target model;
(2) Both training set and test set samples.
With both, the attacker trains a local model—specifically, a
GAN—that aims to detect overfitting in the target model. In
(1), the discriminator of the attacker GAN, Dbb, is trained us-
ing samples generated by Gbb, labeled as fake samples, and
both samples from the auxiliary training set and target gen-
erated samples, labeled as real. Intuitively, we expect the at-
tacker model to be stronger at recognizing overfitting in the
target model, if it has auxiliary knowledge of samples on
which it was originally trained. In (2), Dbb is trained on sam-
ples generated by Gbb and samples from auxiliary set of test
ones, labeled as fake samples, and samples generated by the
target model and samples from the auxiliary training set, la-
beled as real. The attacker GAN is trained to learn to discrim-
inate between test and training samples directly. Again, once
the attacker has trained their model, data-points from X are
fed into Dbb, and their predictions are sorted as per Fig. 3.
5 Evaluation
In this section, we present an experimental evaluation of the
attacks described above.
5.1 Experimental Setup
Testbed. Experiments are performed using PyTorch on a
workstation running Ubuntu Server 16.04 LTS, equipped with
a 3.4GHz CPU i7-6800K, 32GB RAM, and an NVIDIA Titan
6
X GPU card. Source code is available upon request and will
be made public along with the final version of the paper.
Settings. For white-box attacks, we measure membership in-
ference accuracy at successive epochs of training the target
model, where one epoch corresponds to one round of train-
ing on all training set inputs.2 For black-box attacks, we fix
the target model and measure membership inference accuracy
at successive training steps of the attacker model, where one
training step is defined as one iteration of training on a mini-
batch of inputs. The attacker model is trained using soft and
noisy labels as suggested in [54], i.e., we replace labels with
random numbers in [0.7, 1.2] for real samples, and random
values in [0.0, 0.3] for fake samples. Also, we occasionally
flip the labels when training the discriminator. These GAN
modifications are known to stabilize training in practice [12].
Datasets. We perform experiments using two popular image
datasets as well as a health-related dataset:
1. Labeled Faces in the Wild (LFW) [25], which includes
13,233 images of faces collected from the Web;
2. CIFAR-10 [32], with 60,000 32x32 color images in 10
classes, with 6,000 images per class;
3. Diabetic Retinopathy (DR) [29], consisting of 88,702
high-resolution retina images taken under a variety of im-
age conditions.
For LFW and CIFAR-10, we randomly choose 10% of the
records as the training set. The LFW dataset is “unbalanced,”
i.e., some people appear in multiple images, while others only
appear once. We also perform experiments so that the train-
ing set is chosen to include the ten most popular classes of
people in terms of number of images they appear in, which
amounts to 12.2% of the LFW dataset. Intuitively, we expect
that models trained on the top ten classes will overfit more
than the same models trained on random 10% subsets, as we
are training on a more homogeneous set of images.
Note that experiments using the DR dataset are presented
in Section 5.7, which discusses a case-study evaluation on a
dataset of medical relevance. From DR, we select images with
moderate to proliferate diabetic retinopathy presence, and use
them to train the generative target model.
Models. Since their introduction, a few GAN [20] variants
have been proposed to improve training stability and sample
quality. In particular, deep convolutional generative adversar-
ial networks (DCGANs) [52] combine the GAN training pro-
cess with convolutional neural networks (CNNs). CNNs are
considered the state of the art for a range image recognition
tasks; by combining CNNs with the GAN training processes,
DCGANs perform well at unsupervised learning tasks such as
generating complex representations of objects and faces [52].
GANs have also been combined with VAEs [34]: by collaps-
ing the generator (of the GAN) and decoder (of the VAE)
into one, the model uses learned feature representations in
the GAN discriminator as the reconstructive error term in the
VAE. It has also been shown that combining the DCGAN ar-
chitecture with a VAE yields more realistic generated sam-
2We update model weights after training on mini-batches of 32 samples.
ples [45]. More recently, Boundary Equilibrium GAN (BE-
GAN) [8] have been proposed as an approximate measure of
convergence. Loss terms in GAN training do not correlate
with sample quality, making it difficult for a practitioner to de-
cide when to stop training. This decision is usually performed
by visually inspecting generated samples. BEGAN proposes a
new method for training GANs by changing the loss function.
The discriminator is an autoencoder and the loss is a function
of the quality of reconstruction achieved by the discriminator
on both generated and real samples. BEGAN produces realis-
tic samples [8], and is simpler to train since loss convergence
and sample quality is linked with one another.
We evaluate our attacks using, as the target model:
1. DCGAN [52],
2. DCGAN+VAE [34], and
3. BEGAN [8],
while fixing DCGAN as the attacker model. This choice of
models is supported by recent work [38], which shows that
no other GAN model performs significantly better than our
choices. [38] also demonstrates that VAE models perform sig-
nificantly worse than any GAN variant.
5.2 Strawman Approaches
We begin our evaluation with a naı¨ve Euclidean distance
based attack. Given a sample generated by a target model, the
attacker computes the Euclidean distance between the gener-
ated sample and every real sample in the dataset. Repeating
this multiple times for newly generated samples, the attacker
computes an average distance from each real sample, sorts
the average distances, and takes the smallest n distances (and
the associated real samples) as the guess for the training set,
where n is the size of the training set.
We perform this attack on a target model (DCGAN) trained
on a random 10% subset of CIFAR-10 and a random 10%
subset of LFW, finding that the attack does not perform better
than if the attacker were to randomly guess which real samples
were part of the original training set. For completeness, results
are reported in Fig. 15 in Appendix A. In Appendix A, we
also discuss another unsuccessful approach, based on train-
ing a shadow model, inspired by the techniques proposed by
Shokri et al. [57].
5.3 White-Box Attack
We now present the results of our evaluation of the white-
box attack described in Section 4.2 on LFW and CIFAR-10.
For the LFW dataset, we build the training set either as a ran-
dom 10% subset of the dataset or the top ten classes. For
CIFAR-10, the training set is a random 10% subset of the
dataset. The target models we implement are DCGAN, DC-
GAN+VAE, and BEGAN. In the rest of this section, we will
include a baseline in the plots (red dotted line) that corre-
sponds to the success of an attacker randomly guessing which
samples belong to the training set.
Fig. 5a shows the accuracy of a white-box attack against
a target model trained on the top ten classes of the LFW
dataset. We observe that both DCGAN and DCGAN+VAE
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Figure 5: Accuracy of white-box attack with different datasets and training sets.
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Figure 6: Accuracy of black-box attack on different datasets and training sets.
are vulnerable to the white-box attack. For DCGAN and DC-
GAN+VAE target models trained for 100 epochs, the attacker
infers training set membership with 80% accuracy, and for
models trained for 400 epochs – with 98% and 97% accuracy,
respectively. The BEGAN target model does overfit, although
to a lesser extent: after 400 epochs, an attacker with white-box
access to the BEGAN target model can infer membership of
the training set with 60% accuracy. In Fig. 5b, we report the
results of white-box attacks against a target model trained on
a random 10% subset of the LFW dataset. Similar to Fig. 5a,
both DCGAN and DCGAN+VAE are vulnerable: when these
are trained for 250 epochs, an attacker can achieve perfect
training set membership inference. BEGAN performs similar
to the top ten classes white-box experiment, achieving 62%
accuracy after 400 epochs. Finally, Fig. 5c plots the accuracy
of the white-box attack against a target model trained on a
random 10% subset of CIFAR-10.
For DCGAN, results are similar to DCGAN on LFW, with
perfect training set membership inference after 400 epochs.
However, DCGAN+VAE does not leak information (does not
overfit) until around 250 epochs, where accuracy remains rela-
tively steady, at 10-20%. Instead, after 250 epochs, the model
overfits, with accuracy reaching 80% by 400 epochs. BE-
GAN, while producing quality samples, does not overfit, with
final training set membership inference accuracy of 19%, i.e.,
only 9% better than random guess. Due to the limited ac-
curacy of BEGAN in comparison to other models, we dis-
card it as a target model for black-box attacks as it does not
seem to be vulnerable to membership inference attacks. Note
that GAN models need to be trained for hundreds of epochs
before reaching good samples quality. Indeed, the original
DCGAN/BEGAN papers report 2x and 1.5x the number of
network updates (when adjusted for training set size) as our
white-box attack, to train DCGAN and BEGAN, respectively.
In summary, we conclude that white-box attacks infer the
training set with up to perfect accuracy when DCGAN and
DCGAN+VAE are the target models. On the other hand, BE-
GAN is less vulnerable to white-box attacks, with up to 62%
accuracy.
5.4 Black-Box Attack with No Auxiliary
Knowledge
Next, we present the results of the black-box attacks (see
Section 4.3) on LFW and CIFAR-10. We assume the attacker
has no knowledge of the training or test sets other than the size
of the original training set. Once again, for LFW, the training
set is either a random 10% subset of the dataset or the top
ten classes, while, for CIFAR-10, the training set is always
a random 10% subset of the dataset. The target models we
implement are DCGAN and DCGAN+VAE (fixed at epoch
400), and the attacker model uses DCGAN.
Fig. 6a plots the results of a black-box attack against a tar-
get model trained on the top ten classes of the LFW dataset.
After training the attacker model on target queries, the attack
achieves 63% training set membership inference accuracy for
both DCGAN and DCGAN+VAE target models. Surprisingly,
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the attack performs equally well when the target model differs
from the attack model as when the target and attack model
are identical. This highlights the fact that the attacker does
not need to have knowledge of the target model architecture
in order to perform the attack.
In Fig. 6b, the results are with respect to a target model
trained on a random 10% subset of the LFW dataset. Once
again, we find that DCGAN and DCGAN+VAE target models
are equally vulnerable to a black-box attack. An attacker with
no auxiliary information of the training set can still expect to
perform membership inference with 40% (38%) accuracy for
the DCGAN (DCGAN+VAE) target model.
Finally, Fig. 6c plots the accuracy of a black-box attack
against a target model trained on a random 10% subset of the
CIFAR-10 dataset. For the DCGAN+VAE target model, ac-
curacy reaches 20% after 1,000 training steps and stays flat.
For the DCGAN target model, the attacker can infer training
set membership with 37% accuracy, with accuracy improving
steadily throughout the attacker model training process.
We observe that the difference in attack success between
the DCGAN and DCGAN+VAE target models with CIFAR-
10 and the similar success of the two models with LFW occur
in both white-box and black-box attacks. As expected, the
best results are obtained when the attacker and target model
have the same architecture. However, the attack does not
overwhelmingly suffer under differing architectures. In fact,
in LFW experiments there is a negligible difference in attack
success, and, in the CIFAR-10 black-box experiments, the dif-
ference in accuracy is approximately 17%.
In summary, we conclude that our black-box attacks are less
successful, compared to white-box attack, in inferring mem-
bership, but perform similarly against different target model
architectures.
5.5 Black-Box Attack with Limited Auxiliary
Knowledge
As discussed in Section 4.4, we also consider black-box
attacks where the attacker has some limited auxiliary knowl-
edge of the dataset, and uses this knowledge to recover the
full training set. We now present the results of these attacks
on random 10% subsets of LFW and CIFAR-10 with DCGAN
attacker and target models (fixed at epoch 400).
We consider different scenarios where the attacker has
knowledge of 20–30% of the training set, 20-30% of the test
set, or both. Nonetheless, the total number of samples of
which the attacker has knowledge is quite modest. For LFW,
20% of the random 10% training set corresponds to 264 out of
1,323 images, 20% of the test set to 2,382 out of 11,910 im-
ages, whereas, for CIFAR-10, 20% of the random 10% train-
ing set amounts to 1,200 out of 6,000 images, and 20% of the
test set to 10,000 out of 50,000 images. An attacker with aux-
iliary information of the training and test set has access to la-
bels, and therefore may not need to train a generative model to
perform a membership inference attack on a generative model.
We also show that, while the attacker can train a discrimi-
native model to perform membership inference, such an ap-
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Figure 7: Membership inference accuracy using a discrimi-
native model, when the attacker has knowledge of (i) 20% of
the test set, or (ii) 30% of both training and test sets. Random
guess in (i) and (ii) corresponds, respectively, to 14% and 12%
accuracy.
proach produces worse results than the generative method.
Discriminative approach. If an attacker has access to true la-
bels within the dataset, they can train a discriminative model
on these samples in order to learn to classify training sam-
ples correctly. For both LFW and CIFAR-10 DCGAN target
models, trained on a random 10% subset of the dataset, we
consider two settings:
(i) the attacker has 20% knowledge of the test set; or
(ii) the attacker has 30% knowledge of both the training and
test set.
We use the discriminator from DCGAN as the discrimina-
tive model trained by the attacker. In (i), we pass test set sam-
ples to the discriminator labeled as fake samples, and target
generated ones labeled as real. In (ii), we pass test set samples
to the discriminator labeled as fake ones, and target generated
and training set samples labeled as real ones.
In Fig. 7, we plot the accuracy results for both settings,
showing that the attack fails with both datasets when the at-
tacker has only test set knowledge, performing no better than
random guessing. Whereas, if the attacker has both train-
ing and test knowledge, with LFW, the attacker recovers the
training set with 50% accuracy, while, for CIFAR-10, accu-
racy reaches 33%. Note that this approach does not improve
on CIFAR-10 black-box results with no auxiliary knowledge,
and only marginally improves on LFW results. As a result,
we also experiment with generative approaches to black-box
attacks with auxiliary attacker knowledge, as discussed next.
Generative approach. We consider the same set of experi-
ments with similar settings for attacker knowledge as in the
discriminative approach; the only difference is that in one of
the settings we now assume the attacker has 20% knowledge
of the training set rather than the test set. We use DCGAN as
the generative attacker model. Specifically, we consider that
the attacker has:
(1) 20% knowledge of the training set; or
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Figure 8: Black-box attack results with 20% attacker training set knowledge for DCGAN/DCGAN+VAE target models, trained
on a random 10% subset of LFW, for different delays at which auxiliary knowledge is introduced into the attacker model training.
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Figure 9: Black-box results when the attacker has (a) knowledge of 20% of the training set or (b) 30% of the training set and
test set. The training set is a random 10% subset of the LFW or CIFAR-10 dataset, and the target model is fixed as DCGAN.
(2) 30% knowledge of both the training and test set.
In all the experiments, we introduce a delay of 1000 train-
ing steps before the attacker model uses the auxiliary attacker
knowledge. Introducing the auxiliary knowledge early in
training process of the attacker model resulted in a weaker
discriminator – see Fig. 8.
In Fig. 9a, we plot results for setting (1): clearly, there is
a substantial increase in accuracy for the LFW dataset, from
40% attack accuracy to nearly 60%. However, there is no in-
crease in accuracy for the CIFAR-10 dataset. Thus, we con-
clude that setting (1) does not generalize. Fig. 9b shows re-
sults for setting (2); for both LFW and CIFAR-10 there is a
substantial improvement in accuracy. Accuracy for the LFW
experiment increases from 40% (with no auxiliary attacker
knowledge) to 60%, while, for CIFAR-10, from 37% to 58%.
Thus, we conclude that, even a small amount of auxiliary
attacker knowledge can lead to greatly improving membership
inference attacks.
5.6 Training Performance
We also set out to better understand the relationship be-
tween membership inference and training performance. To
this end, we report, in Fig. 10, the attack accuracy and sam-
ples generated at different training stages by the target DC-
GAN generator in the white-box attack (Fig. 10a) and the at-
tacker DCGAN generator in the black-box attack (Fig. 10b)
on the top ten classes from the LFW dataset. The plots demon-
strate that accuracy correlates well with the visual quality of
the generated samples. In particular, samples generated by the
target yield a better visual quality than the ones generated by
the attacker generator during the black-box attack, and this re-
sults in higher membership inference accuracies. Overall, the
samples generated by both attacks at later stages look visually
pleasant, and fairly similar to the original ones.
Our attacks have been evaluated on datasets that consist of
complex representations of faces (LFW) and objects (CIFAR-
10). In Appendix B, we include real and generated samples in
multiple settings; see Figures 18–24. In particular, as shown
in Fig. 17a, real samples from LFW contain rich details both
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Figure 10: Accuracy curves and samples at different stages of training on top ten classes from the LFW dataset, showing a clear
correlation between higher accuracy and better sample quality.
in the foreground and background. We do not observe any
large deviations in images within datasets, excluding that the
attack performs well due to some training samples being more
easily learned by the model, and so predicting with higher
confidence. Learning the distribution of such images is a
challenging task compared to simple datasets such as MNIST,
where samples from each class have extremely similar fea-
tures. In fact, our black-box attack is able to generate realistic
samples (see differences between the target model samples in
Fig. 17b and the attacker samples in Fig. 17c).
5.7 Evaluation on Diabetic Retinopathy
Dataset
Finally, we present a case study of our attacks on the
Diabetic Retinopathy (DR) dataset, which consists of high-
resolution retina images, with an integer label assigning a
score of the degree to which the participant suffers from di-
abetic retinopathy. Diabetic retinopathy is a leading cause of
blindness in the developed world, with detection currently per-
formed manually by highly skilled clinicians. The machine
learning competition site kaggle.com has evaluated proposals
for automated detection of diabetic retinopathy, and submis-
sions have demonstrated high accuracies. of manual detec-
tion.
We choose this additional dataset since the generation of
synthetic medical images through generative models is a pow-
erful method to produce large numbers of high-quality sample
data on which useful machine learning models can be trained.
Thus, our attacks raise serious privacy concerns, in practice,
in such sensitive settings as they involve (sensitive) medical
data.
As discussed in Section 5.1, the dataset includes 88,702
high-resolution retina images under various imaging condi-
tions. Each image is labelled with an integer representing how
present is diabetic retinopathy within the retina, from 0 to 4.
We train the generative target model on images with labels 2,
3 and 4, i.e., with mild to severe cases of diabetic retinopathy.
These make up 19.7% of the dataset. (Fig. 18 in Appendix B
show real and target generated samples of retina images.)
The results of the white-box attack are reported in Fig. 11a:
the attack is overwhelmingly successful, nearing 100% accu-
racy at 350 training epochs. Fig. 11b shows the black-box
attacks results, when an attacker has no auxiliary knowledge,
and when the attacker has 30% training and test set auxiliary
knowledge. A no-knowledge black-box attack does not per-
form very well, while, with some auxiliary knowledge, it ap-
proaches the accuracy of the white-box attack, peaking at over
80% after 35K training steps.
6 Discussion
In this section, we summarize our results, then, measure the
sensitivity of the attacks to training set size and prediction or-
dering. Finally, we study robustness to possible defenses.
6.1 Summary of Results
Overall, our analysis shows that state-of-the-art generative
models are vulnerable against membership inference attacks.
In Table 1, we summarize the best accuracy results for experi-
ments on random 10% training sets (LFW, CIFAR-10) and the
diabetic retinopathy (DR) dataset experiments.
We note that, for white-box attacks, the attacker success-
fully infers the training set with 100% accuracy on both the
LFW and CIFAR-10 datasets, and 95% accuracy for DR
dataset. Accuracy drops to 40% on LFW, 37% on CIFAR-
10 and 22% on DR for black-box attacks with no auxiliary
knowledge, however, even with a small amount of auxiliary
knowledge, the attacker boost performance up to 60% on
LFW, 58% on CIFAR-10 and 81% on DR. Note that a random
guess corresponds to 10% accuracy on LFW and CIFAR-10,
and 20% on DR. Further, we show that our attacks are robust
against different target model architectures.
6.2 Sensitivity to training set size and predic-
tion ordering
Aiming to measure the dependency between attack perfor-
mance and training set size, we experiment with varying train-
ing set sizes in the DCGAN target and attacker model setting.
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Figure 11: Accuracy curves of attacks against a DCGAN target model on the Diabetic Retinopathy dataset.
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Figure 12: Improvements over random guessing, in a black-box attack, as we vary the size of the training set, and consider
smaller subsets for training set predictions.
Attack LFW CIFAR-10 DR
White-box 100% 100% 95%
Black-box with no knowledge 40% 37% 22%
Black-box with limited knowledge 60% 58% 81%
Random Guess 10% 10% 20%
Table 1: Accuracy of the best attacks on random 10% train-
ing set for LFW and CIFAR-10, and for diabetic retinopathy
(DR).
Fig. 12 shows how the improvement of the attack degrades
as the relative size of the training set increases. Note that
we only include black-box attack results, as all white-box at-
tacks achieve almost 100% accuracy regardless of training set
size. Overall, we find that there is a commonality in the ex-
periments: black-box attacks on 10% of the dataset achieve
an improvement of 40–55%, and, as we increase the number
of data-points used to train the target model, the attack has
smaller and smaller improvements over random guessing.
The largest increases are in the setting of Fig. 12a, where
data-points are more homogeneous and so overfitting effects
are compounded. When the training set is 90% of the total
dataset used in the evaluation of the attack, the attack has neg-
ligible improvements over random guessing. We believe that
this might be due either to: (1) the larger number of training
data-points yields a well-fitted model that does not leak in-
formation about training records, or (2) a small number of
data-points within the training set do not leak information,
therefore, as we increase the size of the training set, the inabil-
ity to capture these records becomes more costly, resulting in
smaller improvements in attack performance.
If the former were true, we would see smaller improve-
ments for larger training sets, regardless of the total size of
the dataset; however, experiments on both LFW and CIFAR-
10, which consist of different training sizes, report similar im-
provements over random guessing. Additionally, white-box
attacks are not affected by increasing the training set size,
which would be the case if the model did not overfit and thus
leak information about training records. Hence, we believe
a small number of training records are inherently difficult to
capture, and so improvements over random guessing for larger
training set sizes are more difficult to achieve since the major-
ity of samples are used to train the target model.
We also examine the attack sensitivity to the ordering of
the data-point predictions. So far, the only prior knowledge
the attacker has is the approximate size of the training set. If
there is a clear ordering of data-points predictions, with train-
ing records sitting at the top of the ordering, and non-training
records lower down, an attacker can use this information to
identify training records without side knowledge of training
set size. They can simply place a confidence score relative to
where in the ordering a data-point predictions sits.
Fig. 12 shows, for varying training set sizes, how many
training records lie in the top 20%, 40%, 60%, 80%, and 100%
of the guessed training set. We observe that, in all experimen-
tal settings, accuracy for the top 20% is highest, with scores
decreasing as the attacker considers a larger number of data-
points as candidates for the training set.
Thus, training to non-training samples follows a structured
ordering in the attacker’s predictions, which can be exploited
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Figure 13: Improvement over random guessing for Weight
Normalization and Dropout defenses against white-box at-
tacks on models trained over different number of classes with
LFW.
to infer membership when the attacker has no knowledge of
the original training set size by setting a threshold on the min-
imum confidence of a training point.
6.3 Defenses
Possible defense strategies against membership inference
(see [57]), e.g., restricting the prediction vector to the top k
classes, coarsening and increasing the entropy of the predic-
tion vector, are not well suited to our attacks, since generative
models do not output prediction vectors. However, regulariza-
tion techniques and differential privacy could possibly be ap-
plied to generative models to produce more robust and stable
training as well as more diverse and visually pleasant samples.
Weight Normalization and Dropout. To this end, we con-
sider two techniques, namely, Weight Normalization [55]
and Dropout [59], as possible defense mechanisms and eval-
uate their impact on our attacks.3 The former is a re-
parameterization of the weights vectors that decouples the
length of those weights from their direction, and it is applied
to all layers in both generator and discriminator in the target
model. Whereas, the latter can be used to prevent overfitting
by randomly dropping out (i.e., zeroing) connections between
neurons during training—in particular, we apply Dropout,
with probability 0.5, to all the layers in the discriminator.
In Fig. 13, we measure the improvement over ran-
dom guessing for the white-box attack against the target
model trained on LFW using either Weight Normalization or
Dropout. With Weight Normalization, we get improvements
over random guessing of, respectively, 88% and 46%, which
are very close to the target model trained with no defenses
(resp., 89% and 52%). Dropout is more effective, as the im-
provements over random guessing go down to 70% on top 10
classes and 23% on top 500 classes.
However, Dropout significantly slows down the training
process, requiring more epochs to get qualitatively plausible
3Note that we do not compare models with and without Batch Normaliza-
tion [26], as its inclusion has shown to improve sample quality and is nearly
always used in model construction of GANs [52].
Figure 14: Accuracy curve and samples for different privacy
budgets on top ten classes from the LFW dataset, showing a
trade-off between samples quality and privacy guarantees.
samples. Also, Weight Normalization often results in training
instability (i.e., the discriminator outperforms the generator,
or vice-versa).
Differentially Private GANs. We also evaluate our attack
against a recently proposed technique for (ε, δ)-Differentially
Private GANs [62], where Gaussian noise [16] is injected in
the discriminator forward pass during training. Fig. 14 shows
the results of a white-box attack against Differentially Private
DCGAN trained on top ten classes for different values of the
privacy budget ε (with δ set to 10−4). For all experiments, the
target model is trained for 500 epochs and the final privacy
budget is computed using moments accountant [1]. The attack
does no better than random guessing for ε = 1.5 (first tick in
the plot), while accuracy increases up to 85% for ε = 28.3.
However, note that acceptable levels of privacy (i.e., values of
ε < 10) yield very bad samples quality.
Using our attacks as defense. Also note that, as discussed in
Section 1, our attacks can actually be used as a defense mech-
anism. The difference in white-box and black-box accuracy
provides information about how well the local model approxi-
mates the target model, thus, one could use this information to
train a target model which cannot be well approximated. Fur-
thermore, similarly to early-stopping criteria in model train-
ing, one can stop training when visual sample quality is high
but white-box attack accuracy is still low.
In our experiments, we also observe the benefits of a more
regularized model in increasing the robustness against infor-
mation leakage in the case of BEGAN. For instance, in white-
box attacks on CIFAR-10, BEGAN produces quality samples
without overfitting, with membership inference performing
only 9% better than random guessing (see Fig. 5c).
6.4 Cost of the Attacks
Finally, we quantify the cost of the attacks in terms of com-
putational and time overhead, and estimate monetary costs.
To perform the attacks, the attacker needs a GPU, which can
be obtained for a cost in the order of $100. The attacks have
minimal running time overheads: for the white-box attack,
complexity is negligible as we only query a pre-trained target
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model to steal discriminator model parameters, whereas, for
black-box, one step of training the attacker model takes 0.05
seconds in our testbed. Black-box attacks with no auxiliary
attacker knowledge yield the best results after 50,000 train-
ing steps, therefore, an attacker can expect best results after
approximately 42 minutes with 32 × 50,000 queries to the
target model (since we define one training step as one mini-
batch iteration, with 32 inputs per mini-batch). For attacks
with auxiliary knowledge, the best results are reached after
15,000 training steps, thus, approximately 13 minutes.
We also estimate monetary cost based on current dis-
criminative MLaaS pricing structures from Google.4 At a
cost of $1.50 per 1,000 target queries, after an initial 1,000
free monthly queries, the black-box attack with no auxiliary
knowledge would cost $2,352, while the black-box attack
with auxiliary knowledge $672. Therefore, we consider our
attacks to have minimal costs, especially considering the po-
tential severity of the information leakage they enable.
7 Conclusion
This paper presented the first evaluation of membership infer-
ence attacks against generative models, showing that a variety
of models lead to important privacy leakage. Our attacks are
cheap to run, do not need information about the model under
attack, and generalize well. Moreover, membership inference
is harder to mount on generative models than it is on discrim-
inative ones; in the latter, the attacker can use the confidence
the model places on an input belonging to a label to perform
the attack, while in the former there is no such signal.
We conducted an experimental evaluation on state-of-the-
art probabilistic models such as Deep Convolutional GAN
(DCGAN), Boundary Equilibrium GAN (BEGAN), and the
combination of DCGAN with a Variational Autoencoder (DC-
GAN+VAE), using datasets with complex representations of
faces (LFW), objects (CIFAR-10), and medical images with
real-world privacy concerns (Diabetic Retinopathy). We
showed that the white-box attack can be used to detect over-
fitting in generative models and help selecting an appropriate
model that will not leak information about samples on which
it was trained. We also demonstrated that our low-cost black-
box attack can perform membership inference using a novel
method for training GANs, and that an attacker with limited
auxiliary knowledge of dataset samples can remarkably im-
prove their accuracy.
Moreover, we experimented with regularization techniques,
such as Weight Normalization [55] and Dropout [59], and dif-
ferentially private mechanisms, which could be used to mit-
igate our attacks. We found that they are effective up to a
certain extent, but need longer training, yield training insta-
bility, and/or worse generated samples (in terms of quality).
This motivates the need for future work on defenses against
information leakage in generative models.
Our work also provides evidence that models that general-
ize well (e.g., BEGAN) yield higher protection against mem-
4https://cloud.google.com/vision/pricing
bership inference attacks, confirming that generalization and
privacy are associated. Thus, our evaluation may be used to
empirically assess the generalization quality of a generative
model, which is an open research problem of independent in-
terest. As part of future work, we plan to apply our attacks to
other privacy-sensitive datasets, including location data.
Acknowledgments. This work was partially supported
by The Alan Turing Institute under the EPSRC grant
EP/N510129/1 and a grant by Nokia Bell Labs. Jamie Hayes
is supported by a Google PhD Fellowship in Machine Learn-
ing.
References
[1] M. Abadi, A. Chu, I. Goodfellow, H. B. McMahan,
I. Mironov, K. Talwar, and L. Zhang. Deep learning with
differential privacy. In CCS, 2016.
[2] Y. Aono, T. Hayashi, L. Wang, S. Moriai, et al. Privacy-
preserving deep learning: Revisited and Enhanced. In
ATIS, 2017.
[3] M. Arjovsky, S. Chintala, and L. Bottou. Wasserstein
GAN. arXiv 1701.07875, 2017.
[4] G. Ateniese, L. V. Mancini, A. Spognardi, A. Villani,
D. Vitali, and G. Felici. Hacking smart machines with
smarter ones: How to extract meaningful data from ma-
chine learning classifiers. International Journal of Secu-
rity and Networks, 2015.
[5] M. Backes, P. Berrang, M. Humbert, and P. Manoha-
ran. Membership Privacy in MicroRNA-based Studies.
In CCS, 2016.
[6] B. K. Beaulieu-Jones, Z. S. Wu, C. Williams, and C. S.
Greene. Privacy-preserving generative deep neural net-
works support clinical data sharing. bioRxiv, 2017.
[7] Y. Bengio, L. Yao, G. Alain, and P. Vincent. Generalized
denoising auto-encoders as generative models. In NIPS,
2013.
[8] D. Berthelot, T. Schumm, and L. Metz. BEGAN:
Boundary Equilibrium Generative Adversarial Net-
works. arXiv 1703.10717, 2017.
[9] K. Bonawitz, V. Ivanov, B. Kreuter, A. Marcedone, H. B.
McMahan, S. Patel, D. Ramage, A. Segal, and K. Seth.
Practical secure aggregation for privacy preserving ma-
chine learning. In CCS, 2017.
[10] J. A. Calandrino, A. Kilzer, A. Narayanan, E. W. Fel-
ten, and V. Shmatikov. “You Might Also Like:” Privacy
Risks of Collaborative Filtering. In IEEE Security and
Privacy, 2011.
[11] N. Carlini, C. Liu, J. Kos, U´. Erlingsson, and
D. Song. The Secret Sharer: Measuring Unintended
Neural Network Memorization & Extracting Secrets.
arXiv:1802.08232, 2018.
[12] S. Chintala, E. Denton, M. Arjovsky, and M. Mathieu.
How to Train a GAN? Tips and tricks to make GANs
work. https://github.com/soumith/ganhacks, Year.
[13] E. Choi, S. Biswal, B. Malin, J. Duke, W. F. Stewart,
and J. Sun. Generating Multi-label Discrete Electronic
14
Health Records using Generative Adversarial Networks.
In Machine Learning for Healthcare, 2017.
[14] N. Dowlin, R. Gilad-Bachrach, K. Laine, K. Lauter,
M. Naehrig, and J. Wernsing. Cryptonets: Applying
neural networks to encrypted data with high throughput
and accuracy. In ICML, 2016.
[15] W. Du, Y. S. Han, and S. Chen. Privacy-preserving mul-
tivariate statistical analysis: Linear regression and clas-
sification. In ICDM, 2004.
[16] C. Dwork. Differential privacy: A survey of results.
In Theory and Applications of Models of Computation,
2008.
[17] C. Dwork, V. Feldman, M. Hardt, T. Pitassi, O. Rein-
gold, and A. Roth. Generalization in adaptive data anal-
ysis and holdout reuse. In NIPS, 2015.
[18] M. Fredrikson, S. Jha, and T. Ristenpart. Model inver-
sion attacks that exploit confidence information and ba-
sic countermeasures. In CCS, 2015.
[19] M. Fredrikson, E. Lantz, S. Jha, S. Lin, D. Page, and
T. Ristenpart. Privacy in pharmacogenetics: An end-
to-end case study of personalized warfarin dosing. In
USENIX Security, 2014.
[20] I. Goodfellow, J. Pouget-Abadie, M. Mirza, B. Xu,
D. Warde-Farley, S. Ozair, A. Courville, and Y. Bengio.
Generative adversarial nets. In NIPS, 2014.
[21] I. Gulrajani, F. Ahmed, M. Arjovsky, V. Dumoulin, and
A. Courville. Improved training of Wasserstein GANs.
In ICLR (Posters), 2018.
[22] G. Hinton, O. Vinyals, and J. Dean. Distilling the knowl-
edge in a neural network. arXiv 1503.02531, 2015.
[23] B. Hitaj, G. Ateniese, and F. Perez-Cruz. Deep Models
Under the GAN: Information Leakage from Collabora-
tive Deep Learning. In CCS, 2017.
[24] N. Homer, S. Szelinger, M. Redman, D. Duggan,
W. Tembe, J. Muehling, J. V. Pearson, D. A. Stephan,
S. F. Nelson, and D. W. Craig. Resolving individuals
contributing trace amounts of DNA to highly complex
mixtures using high-density SNP genotyping microar-
rays. PLoS Genet, 2008.
[25] G. B. Huang, M. Ramesh, T. Berg, and E. Learned-
Miller. Labeled Faces in the Wild: A Database for
Studying Face Recognition in Unconstrained Environ-
ments. Technical report, University of Massachusetts,
Amherst, 2007. http://vis-www.cs.umass.edu/lfw/lfw.
pdf.
[26] S. Ioffe and C. Szegedy. Batch normalization: Accel-
erating deep network training by reducing internal co-
variate shift. In International Conference on Machine
Learning, 2015.
[27] S. Ji, W. Li, N. Z. Gong, P. Mittal, and R. A. Beyah.
On your social network de-anonymizablity: Quantifica-
tion and large scale evaluation with seed knowledge. In
NDSS, 2015.
[28] J. Jia and N. Z. Gong. Attriguard: A practical defense
against attribute inference attacks via adversarial ma-
chine learning. In USENIX Security, 2018.
[29] Kaggle.com. Diabetic Retinopathy Detection.
https://www.kaggle.com/c/diabetic-retinopathy-
detection#references, 2015.
[30] A. Karpathy, P. Abbeel, G. Brockman, P. Chen, V. Che-
ung, R. Duan, I. Goodfellow, D. Kingma, J. Ho,
R. Houthooft, T. Salimans, J. Schulman, I. Sutskever,
and W. Zaremba. Generative Models. https://blog.
openai.com/generative-models/, 2017.
[31] D. P. Kingma and M. Welling. Auto-Encoding Varia-
tional Bayes. In ICLR, 2013.
[32] A. Krizhevsky and G. Hinton. Learning multiple layers
of features from tiny images. Technical report, Univer-
sity of Toronto, 2009. https://www.cs.toronto.edu/∼kriz/
learning-features-2009-TR.pdf.
[33] M. J. Kusner, J. R. Gardner, R. Garnett, and K. Q. Wein-
berger. Differentially Private Bayesian Optimization. In
ICML, 2015.
[34] A. B. L. Larsen, S. K. Sønderby, H. Larochelle, and
O. Winther. Autoencoding beyond pixels using a learned
similarity metric. In ICLM, 2016.
[35] C. Ledig, L. Theis, F. Husza´r, J. Caballero, A. Cunning-
ham, A. Acosta, A. Aitken, A. Tejani, J. Totz, Z. Wang,
et al. Photo-realistic single image super-resolution us-
ing a generative adversarial network. arXiv 1609.04802,
2016.
[36] Y. Lindell and B. Pinkas. Privacy preserving data min-
ing. In CRYPTO, 2000.
[37] Y. Long, V. Bindschaedler, L. Wang, D. Bu, X. Wang,
H. Tang, C. A. Gunter, and K. Chen. Understanding
Membership Inferences on Well-Generalized Learning
Models. arXiv:1802.04889, 2018.
[38] M. Lucic, K. Kurach, M. Michalski, S. Gelly, and
O. Bousquet. Are GANs Created Equal? A Large-Scale
Study. ArXiv 1711.10337, 2017.
[39] H. B. McMahan, E. Moore, D. Ramage, S. Hampson,
et al. Communication-efficient learning of deep net-
works from decentralized data. In AISTATS, 2017.
[40] F. McSherry. Statistical inference considered harm-
ful. https://github.com/frankmcsherry/blog/blob/master/
posts/2016-06-14.md, 2016.
[41] L. Melis, C. Song, E. De Cristofaro, and V. Shmatikov.
Inference Attacks Against Collaborative Learning.
arXiv:1805.04049, 2018.
[42] A. Narayanan and V. Shmatikov. De-anonymizing social
networks. In IEEE Security and Privacy, 2009.
[43] M. Nasr, R. Shokri, and A. Houmansadr. Machine
Learning with Membership Privacy using Adversarial
Regularization. In ACM CCS, 2018.
[44] D. Nie, R. Trullo, C. Petitjean, S. Ruan, and D. Shen.
Medical Image Synthesis with Context-Aware Genera-
tive Adversarial Networks. In MICCAI, 2017.
[45] otoro.net. Generating Large Images from Latent Vec-
tors. http://blog.otoro.net/2016/04/01/generating-large-
images-from-latent-vectors/, 2016.
15
[46] N. Papernot, M. Abadi, U´. Erlingsson, I. Goodfellow,
and K. Talwar. Semi-supervised knowledge transfer for
deep learning from private training data. In ICLR, 2017.
[47] N. Papernot, P. McDaniel, X. Wu, S. Jha, and A. Swami.
Distillation as a defense to adversarial perturbations
against deep neural networks. In IEEE Security and Pri-
vacy, 2016.
[48] N. Papernot, S. Song, I. Mironov, A. Raghunathan,
K. Talwar, and U´. Erlingsson. Scalable Private Learn-
ing with PATE. In ICLR, 2018.
[49] A. Pyrgelis, C. Troncoso, and E. De Cristofaro.
What Does The Crowd Say About You? Evaluating
Aggregation-based Location Privacy. In PETS, 2017.
[50] A. Pyrgelis, C. Troncoso, and E. De Cristofaro. Knock
Knock, Who’s There? Membership Inference on Aggre-
gate Location Data. In NDSS, 2018.
[51] J. Qian, X.-Y. Li, C. Zhang, and L. Chen. De-
anonymizing social networks and inferring private at-
tributes using knowledge graphs. In INFOCOM, 2016.
[52] A. Radford, L. Metz, and S. Chintala. Unsupervised rep-
resentation learning with deep convolutional generative
adversarial networks. arXiv 1511.06434, 2015.
[53] M. A. Rahman, T. Rahman, R. Laganiere, N. Mo-
hammed, and Y. Wang. Membership Inference At-
tack against Differentially Private Deep Learning Model.
Transactions on Data Privacy, 2018.
[54] T. Salimans, I. Goodfellow, W. Zaremba, V. Cheung,
A. Radford, X. Chen, and X. Chen. Improved Tech-
niques for Training GANs. In NIPS, 2016.
[55] T. Salimans and D. P. Kingma. Weight normalization: A
simple reparameterization to accelerate training of deep
neural networks. In NIPS, 2016.
[56] R. Shokri and V. Shmatikov. Privacy-preserving deep
learning. In CCS, 2015.
[57] R. Shokri, M. Stronati, C. Song, and V. Shmatikov.
Membership inference attacks against machine learning
models. In IEEE Security and Privacy, 2017.
[58] C. Song, T. Ristenpart, and V. Shmatikov. Machine
learning models that remember too much. In ACM CCS,
2017.
[59] N. Srivastava, G. E. Hinton, A. Krizhevsky, I. Sutskever,
and R. Salakhutdinov. Dropout: a simple way to prevent
neural networks from overfitting. Journal of machine
learning research, 2014.
[60] L. Theis, W. Shi, A. Cunningham, and F. Husza´r. Lossy
image compression with compressive autoencoders. In
ICLR, 2017.
[61] F. Trame`r, F. Zhang, A. Juels, M. K. Reiter, and T. Ris-
tenpart. Stealing machine learning models via prediction
apis. In USENIX Security, 2016.
[62] A. Triastcyn and B. Faltings. Generating differen-
tially private datasets using gans. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1803.03148, 2018.
[63] S. Truex, L. Liu, M. E. Gursoy, L. Yu, and W. Wei.
Towards Demystifying Membership Inference Attacks.
arXiv:1807.09173, 2018.
[64] J. Vincent. https://www.theverge.com/2016/7/5/
12095830/google-deepmind-nhs-eye-disease-detection,
2016.
[65] M. J. Wainwright, M. I. Jordan, and J. C. Duchi. Pri-
vacy aware learning. In Advances in Neural Information
Processing Systems, 2012.
[66] X. Wu, M. Fredrikson, W. Wu, S. Jha, and J. F.
Naughton. Revisiting differentially private regression:
Lessons from learning theory and their consequences.
arXiv 1512.06388, 2015.
[67] X. Wu and X. Zhang. Automated Inference on Crimi-
nality using Face Images. arXiv 1611.04135, 2016.
[68] Y. Wu, Y. Burda, R. Salakhutdinov, and R. Grosse. On
the Quantitative Analysis of Decoder-Based Generative
Models. In ICLR (Poster), 2017.
[69] R. Yeh, C. Chen, T. Y. Lim, M. Hasegawa-Johnson, and
M. N. Do. Semantic Image Inpainting with Perceptual
and Contextual Losses. arXiv 1607.07539, 2016.
[70] S. Yeom, I. Giacomelli, M. Fredrikson, and S. Jha. Pri-
vacy risk in machine learning: Analyzing the connection
to overfitting. In IEEE CSF, 2018.
A Unsuccessful Attacks
We now report a few additional results, not included in the
main body of the paper to ease presentation. In Fig. 15, we
report the results of the Euclidean attack presented in 5.2. This
attack was performed on a target model (DCGAN) trained on
a random 10% subset of CIFAR-10 and a random 10% subset
of LFW, but we found that the attack did not perform much
better than a random guess.
We also report on the results of a black-box setting where
10% of training set samples from LFW are used to train a
shadow model – see Fig. 16. Samples generated by this model
are then injected into the attacker model together with the
samples generated by the target model. More specifically, at
training time, each mini-batch is composed of synthetic sam-
ples generated either by the target model or by the shadow
model. However, this attack, inspired by the approach pro-
posed by Shokri et al. [57], only yields around 18% of accu-
racy, with no improvements during training.
B Additional Samples
In Figures 17–24, we report additional examples of samples
deferred from Section 5. Specifically, real and generated sam-
ples are shown in Fig. 17 for LFW and in Fig. 18 for the dia-
betic retinopathy (DR) dataset. Then, Fig. 19 shows real sam-
ples from LFW and CIFAR-10, while Figures 20–23 depict
samples generated by various target models on LFW. Finally,
samples generated by the attacker model on LFW are reported
in Fig. 24.
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Figure 15: Euclidean attack results for DCGAN target model
trained on a random 10% subset of CIFAR-10 and LFW.
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Figure 16: Black-box attack results with 10% auxiliary at-
tacker training set knowledge used to train a DCGAN shadow
model for DCGAN target model trained on a random 10%
subset of LFW.
(a) Real samples (b) Target samples (c) Attacker model samples
Figure 17: Various samples from the real dataset, target model, and black-box attack using the DCGAN target model on LFW,
top ten classes.
(a) Real sample with no presence
of diabetic retinopathy
(b) Real sample with high
presence of diabetic retinopathy
(c) Selection of target generated samples classified with high
confidence as belonging to the training set by both white-box and
black-box attacks
Figure 18: Real and generated diabetic retinopathy dataset samples.
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(a) LFW, top ten classes (b) LFW, random 10% subset (c) CIFAR-10, random 10% subset
Figure 19: Real samples.
(a) LFW, top ten classes (b) LFW, random 10% subset (c) CIFAR-10, random 10% subset
Figure 20: Samples generated by DCGAN target model.
(a) LFW, top ten classes (b) LFW, random 10% subset (c) CIFAR-10, random 10% subset
Figure 21: Samples generated by DCGAN+VAE target model.
Figure 22: Samples generated by BEGAN target model on LFW, top ten classes.
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Figure 23: Samples generated by BEGAN target model on LFW, random 10% subset.
(a) LFW, top ten classes (b) LFW, random 10% subset
Figure 24: Samples generated by attacker model trained on samples from DCGAN target model on (a) LFW, top ten classes and
(b) LFW, random 10% subset.
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